Progress of the Law by Editors,
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
BANKRUPTCY.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, holds In re International Mahogany Co. 147
Detectivo Fed. 147 that where a bankrupt corporation
Mortgage prior to its bankruptcy, to secure an issue of
bonds had executed a mortgage on lands in Cuba which
had there been filed for registry but not recorded owing
to a technical defect, the court will not enjoin the
directors from authorizing .the execution and delivery of
a curative mortgage after bankruptcy, it appearing that
under the law of Cuba the mortgage will be valid from
the date of the entry in the recorder's books of the fact
of its presentation, if the defect is corrected and the
instrument is thereafter duly recorded; the trustee in
bankruptcy having no greater right to object to the cor-
rection than the general creditors would have had if the
bankruptcy had not intervened. Compare In re New
York Economical Printing Co., ino Fed., 514 .
The United States District Court, S. D., New York,
decides In re Tiffany, 147 Fed., 314, that where a state
Withholdi., statute gives judgment creditors the right to
Discharge proceed in equity to reach surplus income of
the debtor in case of certain trusts, which cannot be
reached by execution, but does not give such right to a
trustee in bankruptcy, a court of bankruptcy may, in
its discretion, when equity requires it, delay the granting
of a discharge to a bankrupt and permit judgment cred-
itors, whose judgments would be extinguished by the
discharge, to institute and prosecute suits under such
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
BANKRUPTCY (Coritinued).
statute, to reach income derived by the bankrupt from
a trust estate, for their own benefit. Compare Lockwood
v. lExcinge Bank, 190 U. S., 294.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, decides In re Dresser, 146 Fed., 383, that the
Discharge: fact that the refusal of a bankrupt to answer
teAusw material questions in the course of the pro-to Answer t*
Questions ceedings which were approved by the referee
was based on the claim of his constitutional privilege
not to incriminate himself does not deprive the court of
the right to deny him a discharge because of such refusal,
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and its amend-
ments.
BANKS AND BANKING.
In Daugherty et al v. Poundstone, 96 S. W., 728, the
Kansas City Court of Appeals of Missouri decides that
Rpe~ay=e.t the Trustees of a dissolved banking corpora--
oiv ide tion cannot maintain a suit against a stock-
holder to recover a dividend, which should have been
applied to a judgment obtained against the trustees by a
depositor for the amount of a deposit paid by the dis-
bursing officers on unauthorized checks, until they have
exhausted their remedy against the culpable officers and
their securities.
It is decided by the Supreme Court of North Dakota
in First Nat. Bank of Portage v. State Bank of Northwood
et al., 1o9 N. W., 61, that although a certifi-Certificates
of De-posit cate of deposit payable on demand after a
Interest stated 'period contains a stipulation that it
shall not bear interest after maturity, the holder thereof
is entitled to legal interest thereon from the date when the
bank fails or refuses to meet a demand of payment when
payment is due.
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The United States Circuit Court, E. D., Pennsylvania,
decides in Eastcrn Milling & Export Co. v. Eastern Mill-
Application ng 6' Export Co. of Pennsylvania, 146 Fed.,
of Deposit: 761, that the right given to a bank by a con-
Receivership tract with a depositing and borrowing corpora-
tion to declare any notes of the corporation held by the
bank due in case the corporation became insolvent, and
to apply thereon any sum then on deposit to the corpora-
tion's credit, cannot be exercised after a rceiver has
been appointed for the corporation, since title to the
deposit passed to him at once on his appointment. Com-
pare Chipinan & Holt v. Ninth National Bank, 120 Pa., 86.
The Supreme Court of Iowa decides in Sherwood v.
Home Savuing Bank, 1o9 N. W., o, that where, in an
Localcustom: action against a bank for loss of securities
Evidence intrusted to it for safe-keeping, the bank
pleaded that the securities had been misappropriated
by its cashier, without fault on its part, and that it was
beyond the bank's powers so to receive the securities,
evidence that it was the local custom of banks to receive
valuable papers for customers was admissible as bearing
on the bank's powers as well as on the cashier's authority
so to act for the bank. Compare Wing v. Commercial
Savings Bank, 61 N.W., xoo9.
CARRIERS.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides in Illinois
Cent. R. Co. v. Cruse, 96 S.W., 821, that it not being the
Duty to Assist duty of the employees of a carrier to assist
Psengers a passenger in alighting, because of her sick-
ness or other misfortune, unless such condition is known
to them, it is error to charge that it was their duty to
assist her if her feebleness was known to them, '!or was
apparent," this implying that it was their duty to ob-
serve her condition to see whether she needed assistance.
Compare .herewith Yarnell v. Kansas. City &c. R.R. Co.,
113 Mo., 570, 18 L.R.A., 599.
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In Gray v. Wanash R. Co., 95 S.-V., 983, the Kansas
City Court of Appeals, decides that proof that cars con-
Acceptance taining plaintiff's property were placed on
of FreiZht defendant railroad's connecting track, the
usual place of delivery of freight destined for it as con-
necting carrier, under an arrangement with other roads
that freight so placed would be accepted for further
transportation, did not amount to an acceptance until
defendant took actual charge of the property, accepted
the bill of lading, or performed some other acts amount-
ing in law to an acceptance.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Laurens
v. Anderson, 55 S. E., 136, that a statute exempting
Unjust D,. Confederate veterans who enlisted from the
crinlation state from any license for carrying on business
within the state, is unconstitutional, as providing only
for soldiers and sailors who enlisted from the state, and
ignoring veterans of other wars, as well as soldiers of the
confederacy who enlisted from other states, in that it
deprives persons within the jurisdiction of the state of
the equal protection of the laws.
In Omaha Water Co. v. City of Omaha et al., 147 Fed., i,
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth
municipal Circuit, decides that the power of a city to
contracts regulate or fix the rates which a water, gas,
or railway company may collect of private consumers
partakes of the nature of a governmental power and also
of the nature of a business power and that, therefore,
the Legislature of a state unless prohibited by its Con-
stitution may empower a city to suspend by contract,
and a city may suspend in that way for a reasonable
term of years, its power to fix or regulate the rates which
a third party may collect of private consumers. An
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agreement as to the schedule of rates for an unreasonable
time could it seems be modified without violation of the
constitutional inhibition against impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts.
In Northern Assurance Conipany of London v. Grand
View Building Association, 27 S.C.R., 27, the United
States Supreme Court decides that a judg-
Full Faith ment of the Supreme Court of the United
and Credit States to the effect that a policy of fire in-
surance could not be recovered upon as it stood nor be
helped out by any doctrine of the common law is not
denied full faith and credit by an adjudication of a state
court that such judgment is not a bar to a suit in equity
to reform the policy so that it will express consent to
concurrent insurance, and to recover upon such policy
as reformed. Compare Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Norwood, 16 C.C.A. 136.
CONTEMPT.
In United States v. Collins, 146 Fed., 553, the United
States District Court, D. Oregon, decides that where
accused was committed for contempt for hisCommitment:
Exfr-t o- refusal to appear as a witness before a grand
Order jury and there produce certain records, etc.,
in response to a subpoena duces tecum, the term dur-
ing which he could be imprisoned under such order
expired on the discharge of the grand jury. It is held,
however, that where accused was in prison for his
refusal to obey a subpcena requiring him to appear and
produce records before.a grand jury, and he remained
recalcitrant until after the grand jury was discharged,
he was not thereby purged of his contempt and was
subject to sentence to imprisonment for a specified term.
Compare Ex parte Maulsby, i3 Md., 625.
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CONTRACTS.
In Rathfon v. Locher, 215 Pa., 571, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decides that a promissory note given by
a married woman as surety for her husband'sNotes:
.Moral.. debt, although legally invalid, imports a
Consideration moral consideration, which will be sufficient
to support a renewal note given by the married woman
after her husband's death; and this is the case although
the renewal note was of a date prior to the husband's
death, if it appears that there was no fraud in the
transaction. In this connection see Brooks v. Merchants'
National Bank, 125 Pa., 394.
CRIMINAL LAW.
In Wooley v. State, 96 S. W., 27, the Court of Crim-
inal Appeals of Texas decides that comments by jurors
.Mionduct in a prosecution for seduction on the failure
of Jury of the defendant to take the stand as a wit-
ness in his own behalf are ground for new trial. Com-
pare Thorpe v. State 4o Tex., Cr. R., 346.
DEEDS.
The Supreme Court of Michigan in Leonard v. Leonard
et al., io8 N.W., 985, decides that where a deed in the
Testamoy form of a statutory warranty deed contained
Instrument, a clause that it was not to be operative until
after the death of the grantors, and the depositary was
instructed to care for the deed until after the grantors'
death and then deliver the same to the grantee, it was a
testamentary instrument, and subject to revocation dur-
ing the life of either of the grantors. Applying this
general rule it is decided that where such a deed was
placed in the hands of a depositary for safe keeping, to
be delivered on the grantors' death, the record of the
deed by such depositary after the death of one of the
grantors only did not change the character of the instru-
ment,,so as to make it effective to pass a present interest
in the property. See in this connection Pennington v.
Pennington, 75 Mich., 6oo.
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DIVORCE.
In New Jersey it is provided by statute that if in a
suit for divorce for adultery it appears that both parties
Aduiery: have been guilty of adultery, no divorce should
Condonation be decreed. In Storms v. Storms, 64 AtI.,
700, it is held, however, by the Court of Chancery of
New Jersey, that, where a husband had commited adul-
tery and his offense had been condoned, he was not
"guilty of adultery" within the law referred to, so as
to preclude him from a divorce for the subsequent adul-
tery of his wife. The propriety of the decision is obvious.
In Halloway v. Halloway, 55 S.E., 191, the Supreme
Court of Georgia decides that the conviction of a married
Imprisonamet: person of an offense involving moral turpi-
Pardon tude, followed by a sentence of imprisonment
in the penitentiary of two years or longer, gives to the
other party to the marriage a right to a divorce; and this
right is not affected by an executive pardon granted
after the sentence has been imposed. Compare State v
Duket, 63 N.W., 83, 31 L.R.A., 5r5.
EVIDENCE.
In Porter v. Buckley et al., 147 Fed., 140, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, decides
Opinion: that it is competent for an ordinary witness
Speed of to express an opinion as to the speed an
Automobiles automobile was making at a given time, which
is not, strictly speaking, a scientific inquiry, the weight
of such opinion being for the jury.
EXCHANGES.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit, decides in McDearmott Commission Co. et al. v.
Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 146 Fed.,Property in tae ih
Market 96z, that a board of trade, which has a right
Quotations of property in market quotations collected in
its exchange, does not surrender or dedicate them to
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the public by permitting subscribers, to whom they are
communicated upon condition that they shall not be
made public, to post 'them upon blackboards in their
places of business, where the posting is done for the ad-
vantage of the subscribers, and not of the public, and
does not make knowledge of the quotations general, or
make them accessible to the public as of right, or render
them of no further value. See note to Sullivan v.
Postal Tel. Cable Co., 61 C.C.A., '2.
GARNISHMENT.
In Davis v. Cleveland C., C. & St. L. R. Co., 146 Fed.,
403, the United States Circuit Court, N.D. Iowa, W.D.,
Iht oey holds that sums due to a railroad company
D. Nore. from other companies as its share of freight
dent Carriercollected by them as the terminal or final
carriers on continuous interstate shipments are not sub-
ject to attachment by garnishment of the debtors under
the foreign attachment laws of another state in which
the defendant cannot be personally sued. The case
presents also an interesting discussion of the attachment
of railroad cars. Compare Central Trust Co. v. Railway
Co., 68 Fed., 685.
GRAND JURY.
In Lyon v. Con monwealth, 96 S.W., 857, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky decides that a statutory provision
that no person except the attorney for the
secrecy commonwealth and the witness under exami-
nation shall be present while the grand jury are examining
a charge, and no person whatever while they are deliber-
ating or voting on a charge, does not prohibit the ad-
mission of an interpreter before the grand jury for the
examination of witnesses, whose evidence could not be
otherwise made intelligible to the grand jury.
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INSURANCE.
The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Ogletree v.
Hutchinson, 55 S.E., 179, that a stipulation in a policy
stiplatn.: of life insurance that payment of the amount
Is nCiary of the policy to any relative of the insured
belonging to a designated class will discharge the com-
pany from liability is valid, but such a stipulation does
not have the effect to make the person actually receiving
the money thereunder the -beneficiary of .the policy.
It is merely an appointment, by the parties to the con-
tract, of a person who may collect the amount due under
the policy for the benefit of the person ultimately en-
titled thereto. Compare Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Schaffer, 50 N.J. Law, 72.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi holds in Grand
Lodge &c. v. Smith et al., 42 So., 89, that where insured
was coerced into a marriage, and never there-
a fter cohabited or visited his pretended wife,
she was not his widow, within the terms of an insurance
certificate, payable to insured's "widow or other heirs."
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
;@In Grunnell v. Welch, L.R., (i9o6), 2 K. B., 555, it
appeared that a bailiff, employed to levy a distress for
Distress: Tres.- rent in arrear, illegally broke in the front
pass ab initlo door; he then seized the furniture, but before
selling it left the house, and, being refused admittance
on his return, made no attempt to regain possession.
Subsequently the landlord put in a fresh distress in respect
of the same rent by a different bailiff acting under a fresh
distress warrant, who seized the furniture, which was
replevied before sale by the owner. Under these facts
the Court of Appeals decides that the proceeding under
the first distress .warrant was a trespass ab initio and
void as a distress, and that the landlord, having had no
opportunity of satisfying his claim for rent by means of
that proceeding, could lawfully distrain under the second
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.warrant for the same rent. Compare with this decision
Attack v. Bramwell, 3 B. & S., 520.
MAINTENANCE.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals of Missouri decides
in Phelps v. Mfanicko et al., 96 S.W., 221 that where
What plaintiff, who was not an attorney, agreed
Constitutes to take up plaintiff's cause of action against
defendant, employ lawyers, get up evidence at his own
expense and conduct the litigation to a termination,
the contract was void for maintenance. See also Gilbert
v. Holmes, 64 Ill., 548.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
The Supreme Court of Washington decides in Berg v.
Seattle R. 6 S. Co., 87 Pac., 34, that the motorman and
Fellow conductor of one car on a street railroad, the
Servants cars of which run on schedule time, are fel-
low servants of the motorman and conductor of another
car on the line, so that one of the motormen injured
through the negligence of the other motorman in not
performing his duty of turning on the lights of a block-
light system, and of the conductor of the other car in
not performing his duty to see that his motorman per-
formed such duty, cannot recover from the company.
Compare Grimm v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 84 Pac.,
635.
MERGER.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides in Frank
v. Guarantee Trust &' Safe Deposit Co., 216 Pa., 40, that
where an owner of a ground rent purchasesOlround
Rents: the ground itself and subsequently executes
niortgag, a mortgage without indicating an intention
in the mortgage to prevent a merger of the rent in the
title to the land, and thereafter executes an assignment
of the ground rents to another person, one who takes
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title under foreclosure of the mortgage takes the fee in
the land with the ground rents extinguished, and the
assignee of the ground rents takes nothing by his assign-
ment. Two judges dissent. Compare Ames v. Miller,
91 N.W., 250.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
In Wheeler v. City of Ft. Dodge, io8 N.W., 1057, the
Supreme Court of Iowa decides that a wire stretched
from the roof of a building downward and
Negligenc€ outward across the street, and ending at a
pole to which it is fastened, though stretched pursuant
to the consent of the municipality, and though through
most of its course it is high above the heads of people
using the walks and carriageways, is a nuisance because
an obstruction of the street, the public right extending
indefinitely upward, especially in view of the fact that
it was stretched for the purpose of using it for a danger-
ous performance. It is further held that where a city
permitted a wire to be so stretched it became chargeable
with notice of the nuisance created by the wire the mo-
ment of its erection, and became in legal effect the crea-
tor of the nuisance substantially the same as if the struc-
ture was one of its own making. See Callanan v. Gilman,
14 N.E., 267.
PARTIES.
An interesting decision as to the limfts within which
a cause of action may be amended appears in Hackett
PleadIng: et al. v. Van Frank, 96 S.W., 247, where the
Amcndnent St. Louis Court of Appeals of Missouri, de-
cides that where suit on a cause of action in favor of a
corporation was commenced in the names of the owners
of all the corporate stock, an amendment substituting
the corporation as party plaintiff should have been
allowed, and was not objectionable as changing the
cause of action. See also Lilly v. Tobbeik, 103 Mo., 447.
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
In Berry et al. v. Chase, 146 Fed., 625, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, decides
Liability to that one who has dealt with an agent cannot
Third arty upon discovery of an undisclosed principal
hold both the agent and the principal liable on the con-
tract, but must elect between the two, and, an election
once made, he must abide by it. Compare Fradley v.
Hyland, 37 Fed., 49.
RECORDS.
An interesting case with respect to the publication of
the decision of appellate courts appears in Ex parte
Cour O n Brown, 78 N.E., 553, where it is held that a
publisher has not the unrestricted and un-
conditional right of access to the opinions and decisions
of the Supreme Court to make copies for publication,
the clerk having the right and duty to control by reason-
able rules the inspection and handling of the records of
his office. Compare Banks & Bro. v. West Publishing
Co., 27 Fed., 50.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
hI McMillan et al. v. Noyes et al., 146 Fed., 926, the
United States Circuit Court, D. New Hampshire, decides
Separable that in a suit to enjoin the destruction of a
Controversy water privilege by diverting water from a
stream, the complainant may properly join as defend-
ants the persons who are undertaking such diversion
and one with whom they have contracted to do the work,
and ask for a common injunction against all, and in such
case there is no separable controversy which entitles
the former to remove the cause when the contractor
could not. See notes to Robbins v. Ellenbogen, 18 C.C.A.,
86 and to Mecke v. Valleytown Mineral Co., 35 C.C.A.,
155.
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TAXATION
In Buckner v. Sugg, 96 S.W., 185, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas decides that in taxation proceedings the
Decrlptlon description of the land must be such as fully
of Lau apprises the owner without recourse to the
superior knowledge peculiar to him as owner that the
particular tract of his land is sought to be charged with
a tax lien. It is held, however, that in determining the
sufficiency of the description of land in tax proceedings,
extrinsic evidence is admissible to connect the land with
the description used in the assessment list and other
tax proceedings. Compare Kcely v. Sanders, 99 U. S.,
44'.
TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE NAMES.
Two interesting cases relating to the "Buster Brown"
illustrations in newspapers appear in New York Herald
Unfatr Co. v. Star Co. 146 Fed., 204, and Outcalt v.
Competition New York Herald, 146 Fed., 205. In the
first of these cases it is held that complainant is entitled
to protection in the trade-mark "Buster Brown" as the
title of a comic section of a newspaper, it being shown
that it was the first to use the title, and that it was so
used exclusively by complainant and its licensees for such
length of time as to give it a proprietary right therein.
Whereas in the second case the same Court (United
States Circuit Court, S. D. New York) decides that an
artist has no such common-law right in pictures drawn
by him and sold to another, who published and copy-
righted the same, as to render it unfair competition
in trade for the latter to afterwards publish other
pictures depicting different scenes merely because
they contain characters in imitation of those in the earlier
ones. Compare notes to Scheuer v. Mu!ler, 2o C.C.A.
165, and to Lare v. Harper & Bros., 30 C.C.A.,
376.
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TRADES UNIONS.
An interesting decision is made by the English Court
of King's Bench, in Burke v. Amalgamated Society of
inity of Dyers, L.R., (i9o6), 2 K.B., 583, where it is
Membo, held that the alteration by a trades union,
during the insanity of a member, of a rule as to sick
benefits, to the prejudice of that member, is binding
upon him if made in accordance with the rule authorizing
and regulating the alteration of the rules of the union.
Compare Smith v. Galloway, L.R. (1898) 1 Q.B., 71.
TRESPASS.
In State v. Shevlin-Carpentcr Co., io8 N.W., 935, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, construing a statute of
the State declaring certain acts of trespass
upon state lands a crime, imposing a p~nalty
therefor and fixing the measure of damages to be recovered
in a civil action, construes the statute as intended to
impose upon a casual or involuntary trespasser criminal
punishment and also double damages for his wrongful
acts, and so construed holds the statute not a deprivation
of property without due process of law. Compare Clark
v. Field, 42 Mich., 342.
TRIAL.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Louisville
Ry. Co. v. Masterson, 96 S. W., 534, that where, during
n1isconduct an adjournment of court during the trial of
of Jurors a cause, counsel for plaintiff took a drink with
two of the jurors at the invitation of one of them, but
nothing was said with reference to the case in
question, and defendant's counsel, though he had
knowledge of such fact, proceeded with the trial
until near its completion before he moved that the jury
be discharged because of misconduct, the motion was
properly denied. The case, as will be noted, arose in
Kentucky.
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TRUSTS.
In re Berry et al., 147 Fed., 209, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, decides that
constructive where bankrupts deposited money which they
Trusts had received from petitioners, under a mis-
take of fact to the credit of their general bank account,
and though subsequent to such deposit and prior to the
intervention of bankruptcy, withdrawals were made
from the account, the balance was never below the
amount which they received through mistake, it would
be presumed that the amounts withdrawn were not those
impressed with the trust, and that so long as the bank-
rupt's account equalled or exceeded the amount erro-
neously received that such amount constituted the trust
fund. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. Hawkins, 74 Fed.,
395, 33 L.R.A., 739.
